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INTRODUCTION 
uring the last fifty years, the notion that parties to a 
multistate contract should be allowed, within certain pa-
rameters and limitations, to agree in advance on which state’s 
law will govern their contract (party autonomy) has acquired 
the status of a self-evident proposition, a truism. It has been 
characterized as “perhaps the most widely accepted private in-
ternational rule of our time,”1 a “fundamental right,”2 and an 
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 1. Russell J. Weintraub, Functional Developments in Choice of Law for 
Contracts, 187 RECUEIL DES COURS 239, 271 (1984); see also Thomas M. de 
Boer, Party Autonomy and Its Limitations in the Rome II Regulation, 9 YBK. 
D 
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“irresistible” principle3 that belongs to “the common core of the 
legal systems.”4 Thus, in proverbial terms, party autonomy is 
like “motherhood and apple pie”: virtually nobody is against it 
and most commentators enthusiastically endorse it. This Arti-
cle offers a brief comparative description of the different ways 
in which legal systems slice the apple from which they make 
this pie. 
Although party autonomy is an ancient principle, it did not 
receive widespread statutory sanction until the twentieth cen-
tury.5 In the early part of that century, the only two holdouts 
were the Bustamante Code in Latin America6 and the first Re-
statement of Conflict of Laws in the United States. Although 
Joseph Story, the intellectual father of American conflicts law, 
endorsed party autonomy,7 as did American transactional and 
judicial practice,8 Joseph Beale, the drafter of the first Re-
statement, chose to ignore it because it did not fit into his terri-
torialist scheme. In his view, giving contracting parties the 
freedom to agree on the applicable law would be tantamount to 
                                                                                                                       
PRIV. INT’L L. 19, 19 (2008) (“Party autonomy is one of the leading principles 
of contemporary choice of law.”). 
 2. Erik Jayme, Identité culturelle et intégration: Le droit international 
privé postmoderne, 251 RECUEIL DES COURS 147 (1995) (characterizing party 
autonomy as a fundamental right). 
 3. Alfred E. von Overbeck, L’irrésistible extension de l’autonomie de la 
volonté en droit international privé, in NOUVEAUX ITINÉRAIRES EN DROIT: 
HOMMAGE À FRANÇOIS RIGAUX 619 (1993). 
 4. Ole Lando, The EEC Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual 
Obligations, 24 COM. MRKT. L. REV. 159, 169 (1987). 
 5. See SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, CODIFYING CHOICE OF LAW AROUND THE 
WORLD: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 112 (Oxford Univ. Press 
2014) [hereinafter SYMEONIDES, CODIFYING CHOICE OF LAW]. 
 6. See Convention on Private International Law (The Bustamonte Code), 
Feb. 20, 1928, 86 L.N.T.S. 111. The Bustamante Code was adopted without 
reservations by Cuba, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, and Peru, 
and with reservations by Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Re-
public, Ecuador, El Salvador, Haiti, and Venezuela. For discussion, see 
JÜRGEN SAMTLEBEN, DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO EN AMÉRICA LATINA, 
TEORÍA Y PRÁCTICA DEL CÓDIGO BUSTAMANTE (1983). 
 7. See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 293(b) 
(2d ed. 1841). 
 8. See Pritchard v. Norton, 106 U.S. 124 (1882); Wayman v. Southard, 23 
U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 48 (1825); see also Andrews v. Pond, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 65, 
78 (1839); Thompson v. Ketcham, 8 Johns. 189, 193 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811). 
2014] PARTY AUTONOMY 1125 
giving them a license to legislate.9 Instead, Beale proposed, and 
the first Restatement adopted, an absolute and unqualified lex 
loci contractus rule mandating the application of the law of the 
state in which the contract is made to all aspects of the con-
tract.10 
During the discussion of this rule at the 1928 meeting of the 
American Law Institute (“ALI”),11 Beale had to admit that par-
ty autonomy (which was then known as the doctrine of the par-
ties’ intention) had been accepted by “a majority of the cases,”12 
but argued that its restatement would lead to uncertainty be-
cause it would often be difficult to ascertain the parties’ intent. 
When asked about situations in which the parties clearly ex-
pressed their intent in the contract, he replied with answers 
that assumed that the parties were attempting to evade a fun-
damental policy of the locus contractus. When asked about sit-
uations in which no fundamental policy was involved, he re-
plied that “the man is not yet born who is wise enough” to in-
ventory all gradations of public policy.13 The discussion was ob-
viously hopeless.14 Judge Edward R. Finch, an ALI member, 
presciently warned Beale: 
                                                                                                                       
 9. JOSEPH H. BEALE, TREATISE ON THE CONFLICTS OF LAWS 1080 (1935) 
(“[A]t their will . . . [parties] can free themselves from the power of the law 
which would otherwise apply to their acts.”). In fairness to Beale, other Amer-
ican writers of that period, as well as Judge Learned Hand, took the same 
position against party autonomy. See Gerli & Co. v. Cunard S. S. Co., 48 F.2d 
115, 117 (2d Cir. 1931); RALEIGH C. MINOR, CONFLICT OF LAWS OR PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 401–02 (1901); Ernest Lorenzen, Validity and Effect of 
Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 30 YALE L.J. 655, 658 (1921). But see 
WALTER W. COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 
389–432 (1942). 
 10. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 332 (1934). 
 11. For documentation of these discussions, see Symeon C. Symeonides, 
The First Conflicts Restatement Through the Eyes of Old: As Bad as Its Repu-
tation?, 32 S. ILL. U. L.J. 39, 68–74 (2007) [hereinafter Symeonides, The First 
Conflicts Restatement]. 
 12. Joseph H. Beale, Discussion of Conflict of Law Tentative Draft No. 4, 6 
A.L.I. PROC. 454, 458 (1927–28). 
 13. Id. at 462 (“[T]he man is not yet born who is wise enough to say as to a 
foreign law whether the foreign law really is to be obeyed . . ., whether [its] 
provisions are matters of such interest to the state that passed them that 
they would be enforced or are not.”). 
 14. For the reasons, see Symeonides, The First Conflicts Restatement, su-
pra note 11, at 70–74. 
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[Y]ou will never be able to hold your courts to that sort of a 
rule [i.e., the lex loci contractus]. You can lay it down, but 
human nature is not so constituted that you can make a court 
adopt a general rule which will do injustice in a majority of 
the cases coming with it.15 
History proved Judge Finch right and Beale terribly wrong. 
Even before the American choice-of-law revolution,16 which 
demolished Beale’s Restatement, most courts chose to ignore 
his proscription of party autonomy.17 Recognizing this reality, 
the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws formally sanc-
tioned party autonomy in the all-important Section 187,18 
which is followed today by the vast majority of American 
courts, including some courts that otherwise do not follow the 
Restatement (Second).19 
Meanwhile, in the rest of the world, one choice-of-law codifi-
cation after another recognized party autonomy, especially in 
the last fifty years. As a comprehensive study documents, all 
but two of the eighty-four codifications enacted during this pe-
riod have assigned a prominent role to this principle in contract 
                                                                                                                       
 15. Beale, supra note 12, at 466. 
 16. For a documentation of this revolution, see SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, 
THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 
(2006). 
 17. See PETER HAY, PATRICK J. BORCHERS & SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, 
CONFLICT OF LAWS 1086–87 (5th ed. 2012). 
 18. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971). Section 
187 provides in part: 
The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual 
rights and duties will be applied . . ., unless either 
(a) the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the 
parties or the transaction and there is no other reasonable 
basis for the parties’ choice, or 
(b) application of the law of the chosen state would be con-
trary to a fundamental policy of a state which has a materi-
ally greater interest than the chosen state in the determina-
tion of the particular issue and which, under the rule of sec-
tion 188, would be the state of the applicable law in the ab-
sence of an effective choice of law by the parties. 
Id. 
 19. See HAY, BORCHERS & SYMEONIDES, supra note 17, at 1088; Symeon C. 
Symeonides, Party Autonomy in Rome I and II from a Comparative Perspec-
tive, 28 NED. IPR 191, 192 (2010). 
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conflicts.20 Indeed, many codifications and international con-
ventions have also extended this principle beyond its birth-
place, the field of contracts, to areas such as succession,21 
trusts,22 matrimonial property,23 property,24 and even family 
law25 and torts.26 The latest instrument to strongly endorse 
                                                                                                                       
 20. See SYMEONIDES, CODIFYING CHOICE OF LAW, supra note 5, at 114–15, 
149–51. The two codifications that have not adopted this principle are those 
of Ecuador and Paraguay, both of which were minor revisions of the Busta-
mante Code. See ECUADOR CIV. CODE arts. 15–17; PARAGUAYAN CIV. CODE 
arts. 23–24. At the time of this writing (January 2014), the Paraguayan Par-
liament was considering the adoption of the Hague Principles on Choice of 
Law for International Contracts of 2012 (see infra note 27), which strongly 
endorse party autonomy. 
 21. See, e.g., Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Succession to the 
Estates of Deceased Persons, art. 5, Aug. 1, 1985, 28 I.L.M. 150; Regulation 
650/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on 
Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions and 
Acceptance and Enforcement of Authentic Instruments in Matters of Succes-
sion and on the Creation of a European Certificate of Succession, art. 22, 
2012 O.J. (L 201) 107 (EU); Albanian codif. art. 33.3; Azerbaijani codif. art. 
29; Armenian codif. art. 1292; Belarusian codif. arts. 1133, 1135; Belgian cod-
if. art. 79; Bulgarian codif. art. 89; Burkinabe codif. art. 1044; Czech codif. 
art. 77.4; Estonian codif. art. 25; Italian codif. art. 46; Kazakhstani codif. art. 
1121; South Korean codif. art. 49; Kyrgyzstani codif. art. 1206; Liechtenstein 
codif. art. 29.3; Moldovan codif. art. 1624; Dutch codif. art. 145; Polish codif. 
art. 64.1; Puerto Rican draft codif. art. 48; Quebec codif. arts. 3098–99; Ro-
manian codif. art. 68(1); Serbian draft codif. art. 104; Swiss codif. arts. 90(2), 
91(2), 87(2), 95(2)(3); Tajikistani codif. arts. 1231-32; Ukrainian codif. art. 70; 
Uzbekistani codif. art. 1197. 
  Detailed citations to all choice-of-law codifications cited in this Article 
can be found in SYMEONIDES, CODIFYING CHOICE OF LAW, supra note 5, at 353–
400. Hereinafter, these codifications are referred to with the country of origin 
and the abbreviation “codif.”, regardless of their formal designation, such as 
an act, statute, decree, ordinance, etc., and regardless of whether they are 
free standing “codes” or statutes or whether they form part of another code, 
such as a civil code. 
 22. See Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on Their 
Recognition, art. 6, July 1, 1985, 23 I.L.M. 1389. 
 23. See, e.g., Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Matrimonial 
Property Regimes, art. 3, Mar. 14, 1978, 16 I.L.M. 14. 
 24. See PARTY AUTONOMY IN INTERNATIONAL PROPERTY LAW (Roel Westrik & 
Joroen Van Der Weide eds., 2011). 
 25. See, e.g., Council Regulation 1259/2010, of 20 December 2010 Imple-
menting Enhanced Cooperation in the Area of the Law Applicable to Divorce 
and Legal Separation, art. 5, 2010 O.J. (L 343) 10 (EU); Protocol on the Law 
Applicable to Maintenance Obligations arts. 7-8, Nov. 23, 2007, 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/conventions/txt39en.pdf; Council Regulation 
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party autonomy is the Hague Principles on Choice of Law in 
International Contracts (“Hague Principles”), a soft-law in-
strument adopted by the Hague Conference on Private Interna-
tional Law in November 2012.27 
I. PARAMETERS AND SCOPE OF PARTY AUTONOMY 
Although virtually all modern legal systems espouse the 
principle of party autonomy, they often disagree in defining its 
exact parameters, scope, and limitations. For example, alt-
hough most systems allow parties to choose the applicable law 
only in contracts that are international or multistate, some sys-
tems require that the state of the chosen law must possess a 
certain geographic or other relationship with the contract or 
the parties, while other systems have dispensed with this re-
quirement entirely.28 
The requirement for a geographic nexus to the chosen state is 
only one of several tools—indeed the least precise or effective—
for “policing” party autonomy. To be sure, the very use of the 
word “policing” suggests that party autonomy is not unfettered. 
Indeed, it is not unfettered, and the reasons are the same as 
those for which legal systems restrict the domestic manifesta-
tion of the same principle, usually referred to as “freedom of 
contract.” For example, in contracts involving presumptively 
weak parties, such as consumers or employees, “an unfettered 
freedom to choose a law may be a freedom to exploit a domi-
nant position.”29 Consequently, most domestic laws “curtail 
                                                                                                                       
4/2009, of 18 December 2008 on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition 
and Enforcement of Decisions and Cooperation in Matters Relating to 
Maintenance Obligations, art.15, 2009 O.J. (L 7) 1, 9 (EC). 
 26. See Regulation 864/2007, of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil of 11 July 2007 on the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations 
(Rome II), art. 14, 2007 O.J. (L 199) 40, 46 (EC). 
 27. See Draft Hague Principles as approved by the November 2012 Special 
Commission Meeting on Choice of Law in International Contracts and Rec-
ommendations for the Commentary, Nov. 12-16, 2012, available at 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/contracts2012principles_e.pdf [hereinafter 
Hague Principles]. For an extensive discussion of the Hague Principles, see 
Symeon C. Symeonides, The Hague Principles on Choice of Law for Interna-
tional Contracts: Some Preliminary Comments, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 873 (2013). 
 28. See SYMEONIDES, CODIFYING CHOICE OF LAW, supra note 5, at 116–20. 
 29. ADRIAN BRIGGS, AGREEMENTS ON JURISDICTION AND CHOICE OF LAW 37 
(2008). 
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th[is] freedom,”30 and this curtailment extends to the multi-
state arena. “The frameworks of private international law . . . 
are not subordinated to the private agreement of parties to liti-
gation.”31 
Predictably, however, the various systems use different tech-
niques for policing party autonomy, beginning with the way in 
which they delineate its permissible scope. For example, many 
systems narrow the scope of party autonomy by: 
(1) Excluding from it certain contracts, such as contracts con-
veying real rights in immovable property, consumer contracts, 
employment contracts, insurance contracts, and other con-
tracts involving presumptively weak parties.32 
(2) Excluding certain contractual issues, such as capacity, 
consent, and form.33 
(3) Confining party autonomy to contractual, as opposed to 
non-contractual, issues;34 or 
(4) Otherwise limiting what “law” the parties can choose, i.e.: 
(a) Substantive, as opposed to procedural law, 
(b) Substantive or internal, as opposed to private in-
ternational law, and 
(c) State law, as opposed to non-state norms.35 
These variations in the scope of party autonomy have been 
discussed in detail elsewhere.36 Besides these differences in 
scope, the various systems differ on the public policy limita-
tions to which party autonomy is subject within its defined 
scope. These differences revolve around two analytically dis-
tinct but interdependent questions, which are discussed in the 
next two sections: 
(1) Which state’s standards should be used as the measuring 
stick for determining the limits of party autonomy in multi-
state contracts, namely which state’s law will perform the role 
of lex limitativa? and 
                                                                                                                       
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 13. 
 32. See SYMEONIDES, CODIFYING CHOICE OF LAW, supra note 5, at 125–29. 
 33. See id. at 129–36. 
 34. See id. at 136–37. 
 35. See id. at 137–46. 
 36. See id. at 129–46. 
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(2) Which threshold should be used in defining those limits? 
II. DETERMINING THE LEX LIMITATIVA 
As noted earlier, party autonomy is simply the external side 
of a domestic law principle of “freedom of contract,” which al-
lows contracting parties to derogate from all of the waivable 
rules (jus dispositivum), as opposed to the nonwaivable or 
mandatory rules (jus cogens) of that law, usually referred to as 
rules of public policy. In the domestic context, there is only one 
state whose public policy defines the limits of the parties’ free-
dom of contract—the forum state. But in the multistate con-
text, there are three states that are candidates for this role: 
(1) The state whose law the parties have chosen; 
(2) The state whose law would have been applicable if the 
parties had not chosen a law (hereinafter referred to as the 
“lex causae”); and 
(3) The state whose courts are called upon to decide the case 
(i.e., the forum state, the law of which is hereinafter referred 
to as the “lex fori”).37 
Of the three candidates for the role of lex limitativa, the cho-
sen state should be eliminated because it would lead to circular 
or bootstrapping results.38 This leaves the states of the lex fori 
and the lex causae. The lex fori is relevant because party au-
tonomy operates only to the extent that the lex fori is willing to 
permit through its choice-of-law rules. The lex causae is rele-
vant because, when party autonomy operates, it displaces the 
lex causae. 
When the application of the chosen law exceeds the public 
policy limitations of both the lex fori and the lex causae, the 
chosen law will not be applied.39 Difficulties arise when the 
chosen law: (1) exceeds the limits of the lex fori but not the lex 
                                                                                                                       
 37. In some cases, these three states, or any two of them, will coincide, or 
will impose the same limits on party autonomy. The following discussion fo-
cuses on cases in which these states, or their limits, do not coincide. 
 38. The term “bootstrapping” is a shorthand expression for the American 
colloquialism that “one cannot pull oneself over an obstacle by one’s own 
bootstraps.” 
 39. Conversely, when the application of the chosen law would not exceed 
the limitations of either the lex fori or the lex causae, the chosen law will be 
applied without problems. 
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causae, or (2) exceeds the limits of the lex causae but not the lex 
fori. 
The positions of the various choice-of-law codifications on this 
issue can be clustered into three groups: (1) those that assign 
the role of lex limitativa to the lex fori; (2) those that assign the 
role of lex limitativa to the lex causae; and (3) those that follow 
a combination of the above two positions. 
A. Lex Fori Alone 
The majority of choice-of-law codifications assign the role of 
lex limitativa exclusively to the lex fori. This majority consists 
of: (1) all of the old or “traditional” codifications that recognize 
party autonomy; (2) nearly half (thirty-four out of seventy-two) 
of the codifications adopted in the last fifty years; and (3) three 
international conventions. These codifications do not impose a 
public policy limitation specifically addressing party autonomy 
in multistate contracts. Instead, they all contain a general pub-
lic policy (“ordre public”) reservation or exception not limited to 
contracts, which authorizes the court to refuse to apply a for-
eign law that is repugnant to the forum’s public policy.40 Some 
of those codifications41 and two conventions42 contain an addi-
tional, albeit partly overlapping, exception in favor of the 
“mandatory rules” of the lex fori. 
                                                                                                                       
 40. See, e.g., the following codifications and the pertinent articles indicated 
in parentheses: Afghanistan (art. 35), Angola (art. 22), Algeria (art. 18), Bu-
rundi (art. 10), Cape Verde (art. 22), Central African Republic (art. 47), Chad 
(art. 72), Cuba (art. 21), East Timor (art. 21), Gabon (art. 30), Guatemala 
(art. 31), Guinea-Bissau (art. 22), Japan (art. 42), Jordan (art. 29), North Ko-
rea (arts. 5, 13), Liechtenstein (art. 6), Mexico (art. 12.V), Mongolia (art. 
540.1), Mozambique (art. 22), Paraguay (art. 22), Qatar (art. 38), Rwanda 
(art. 8), Somalia (art. 28), United Arab Emirates (art. 27), Vietnam (art. 
759.3), Yemen (art. 36). 
 41. See the following codifications and the pertinent articles indicated in 
parentheses: Armenia (arts. 1258, 1259), China (arts. 4, 5), FYROM (arts. 5, 
14), South Korea (arts. 7, 10), Macau (arts. 20, 21), Moldova (arts. 1583, 
1584), Taiwan (arts. 7, 8), and Venezuela (arts. 8, 10). 
 42. See Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Contracts for the In-
ternational Sale of Goods, arts. 17, 18, Dec. 22, 1986, 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/conventions/txt31en.pdf; Hague Convention on 
the Law Applicable to Certain Rights in Respect of Securities Held with an 
Intermediary, arts. 11.1, 11.2, July 5, 2006, 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/conventions/txt36en.pdf. 
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B. Lex Causae Alone 
American law takes the opposite position, reasoning that the 
only state that has a legitimate interest to allow or disallow the 
parties’ choice is the state whose law would have been applica-
ble in the absence of choice.43 It is that state’s law that the par-
ties’ choice would displace, and hence it is for that state to de-
termine whether to allow such a displacement and to what ex-
tent. Private parties should not be allowed to evade the public 
policy of that state merely by choosing the law of another state. 
Consequently, American law assigns the role of lex limitativa 
to the lex causae rather than to the lex fori as such.44 The Loui-
siana and Oregon codifications state this position in express 
statutory language, the Uniform Commercial Code (“U.C.C.”) 
does so obliquely, and the Restatement (Second) does so in a 
blackletter section. 
Article 3540 of the Louisiana codification provides that the 
law chosen by the parties applies, “except to the extent that 
that law contravenes the public policy of the state whose law 
would otherwise be applicable” in the absence of that choice.45 
The Oregon codification provides that the law chosen by the 
parties does not apply “to the extent that its application would . 
. . [c]ontravene an established fundamental policy embodied in 
the law that would otherwise govern the issue in dispute” in 
                                                                                                                       
 43. The Peruvian codification may be following a similar position depend-
ing on how one interprets Article 2096. This article provides that “[t]he law 
declared applicable under Article 2095 determines the mandatory rules 
which are to be applied and the limits on the autonomy of the will of the par-
ties.” The quoted provision is ambiguous because Article 2095 provides for 
both the law chosen by the parties and the objectively applicable law. Howev-
er, it seems more logical to assume that the phrase “declared applicable” re-
fers to the objectively applicable law rather than the contractually chosen 
law. In addition, Article 2049 restates the ordre public exception, which oper-
ates in favor of the lex fori. 
 44. Article 29 of the Puerto Rico draft codification takes the unique posi-
tion that the chosen law is applied unless it violates restrictions on party au-
tonomy imposed by both the lex fori and the lex causae. For an explanation of 
the rationale of this provision by its drafter, see Symeon C. Symeonides, Cod-
ifying Choice of Law for Contracts: The Puerto Rico Project, in LAW AND 
JUSTICE IN A MULTISTATE WORLD: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN 
419, 422–24 (J. Nafziger & S. Symeonides eds., 2002). 
 45. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3540 (1992). For a discussion of this provision by its 
drafter, see Symeon C. Symeonides, Private International Law Codification 
in a Mixed Jurisdiction: The Louisiana Experience, 57 RABELSZ 460, 478, 497-
99 (1993). 
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the absence of a choice-of-law clause.46 Neither codification as-
signs an independent role to the ordre public of the lex fori. 
The pertinent section of the U.C.C., Section 1-301, does not 
contain a public policy limitation, but it does restrict party au-
tonomy through the limits of the lex causae. Subsection (c) of 
Section 1-301 lists several other sections of the U.C.C. and pro-
vides that, if any of those sections designates the state of the 
applicable law for the particular transaction, that law governs 
and “a contrary agreement is effective only to the extent per-
mitted by the law so specified.”47 Thus, the “law so specified” as 
applicable to the particular transaction in the absence of party 
choice (i.e., the lex causae, rather than the lex fori) delineates 
the limits of party autonomy under the U.C.C. regime. 
Finally, Section 187(2)(b) of the Restatement (Second), which 
is followed in most states of the United States, also provides 
that the state whose public policy may defeat the parties’ 
choice of law is not the forum state qua forum, but rather the 
state whose law would, under Section 188, govern the particu-
lar issue if the parties had not made an effective choice (i.e., 
the lex causae).48 
Unlike the Louisiana and Oregon codifications, the Restate-
ment (Second) also assigns a residual, but highly exceptional, 
role to the public policy of the forum. Section 90 of the Re-
statement (Second), which is not limited to contracts, preserves 
the traditional ordre public exception of the lex fori as the last 
                                                                                                                       
 46. OR. REV. STAT. § 15.355 (2011). The same section also provides that the 
chosen law does not apply to the extent its application would “[r]equire a par-
ty to perform an act prohibited by the law of the state where the act is to be 
performed under the contract” or “[p]rohibit a party from performing an act 
required by the law of the state where it is to be performed under the con-
tract.” Id. For a discussion of these provisions, see Symeon C. Symeonides, 
Oregon’s Choice-of-Law Codification for Contract Conflicts: An Exegesis, 44 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 205 (2007). 
 47. U.C.C. § 1-301(c) (2012). The listed sections are §§ 2-402 (sales of 
goods); 2A-105 and 2A-106 (leases); 4-102 (bank deposits and collections); 4A-
507 (fund transfers); 5-116 (letters of credit); 6-103 (bulk transfers); 8-110 
(investment securities); and 9-301 through 9-307 (secured transactions). 
 48. See the pertinent part of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 
§ 187 (1971). In addition, the Restatement provides that the state of the lex 
causae must have “a materially greater interest” than the chosen state in the 
determination of the particular issue. Id. § 187(2)(b). In most cases, a conclu-
sion that a state is the state of the lex causae is based, at least in large part, 
on a conclusion that that state has a “materially greater interest” in applying 
its law. 
1134 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 39:3 
shield against entertaining “a foreign cause of action the en-
forcement of which is contrary to a strong public policy of the 
forum.”49 The accompanying Restatement comments explain 
that this exception should be employed only “rarely.”50 The 
comments quote Judge Cardozo’s classic standard, according to 
which, the exception applies only when the foreign law “would 
violate some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent 
conception of morals, some deep-seated tradition of the com-
monweal.”51 Importantly, the Restatement recognizes the dif-
ference between the two public policies, at least as one of de-
gree, by stating that the public policy contemplated by Section 
187 “need not be as strong as would be required to justify the 
forum in refusing to entertain suit upon a foreign cause of ac-
tion under the rule of § 90.”52 
C. Intermediate Solutions and Combinations 
In between the above extremes, one finds several combina-
tions between the standards of the lex fori and those of another 
state, which may be either the state of the lex causae or a third 
state. The Rome Convention enunciated the most widely fol-
lowed model of such a combination,53 which the Rome I Regula-
tion preserved with slight modifications. Under Rome I, the 
chosen law must remain within the limitations imposed by the 
ordre public and the “overriding mandatory provisions” of the 
lex fori.54 However, in consumer and employment contracts, the 
chosen law must also remain within the limitations imposed by 
the “simple” mandatory rules of the lex causae.55 And in all 
other contracts, the chosen law must remain within the limita-
tions of the mandatory rules of the country in which “all other 
                                                                                                                       
 49. Id. § 90 (emphasis added). 
 50. Id. § 90 cmt. c. 
 51. Id. (quoting Loucks v. Standard & Oil Co. of N.Y., 120 N.E. 198, 202 
(N.Y. 1918)). 
 52. Id. § 187 cmt. g. 
 53. See Council Convention 80/934/ECC, on the Law Applicable to Con-
tractual Obligations, arts. 3(3), 5(2), 6(1), 7, 16, 1980 O.J. (L 266) 1, 1–19 
[hereinafter Rome Convention]. 
 54. See Regulation on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations 
(Rome I) art. 21 (ordre public); see also id. art. 9(2) (“overriding mandatory 
provisions” of the lex fori); see also id. art. 9(3) (allowing courts to “give effect” 
to the “overriding mandatory provisions” of the place of performance “in so 
far as” those provisions “render the performance of the contract unlawful”). 
 55. See id. arts. 6(2), 8(1). 
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elements relevant to the situation” (other than the parties’ 
choice) are located.56 
Several national choice-of-law codifications outside the EU 
follow this model, at least to the extent that they protect con-
sumers and employees through the mandatory rules of the lex 
causae.57 
At least a dozen of the codifications that subject the chosen 
law to the limits of the ordre public and mandatory rules of the 
lex fori provide in addition that the court “may” apply or “take 
into account” the mandatory rules of a “third country” with 
which the situation has a “close connection.”58 It is safe to as-
sume that the state of the lex causae would always qualify as a 
state that has a “close connection” because, ex hypothesi, it is 
the state whose law would have been applicable in the absence 
of a choice-of-law clause. This “close connection” will always 
render relevant the mandatory rules of the lex causae, but will 
not necessarily guarantee their application because the perti-
nent articles are phrased in discretionary terms. 
The Mexico City Convention and the Hague Principles follow 
a variation of the above position. Article 18 of the Mexico City 
Convention reiterates the classic ordre public exception, while 
paragraph 1 of Article 11 preserves the application of the man-
datory rules of the lex fori. Paragraph 2 of Article 11 provides 
that “[i]t shall be up to the forum to decide when it applies the 
                                                                                                                       
 56. See id. art. 3(3); cf. id. art. 3(4) (mandatory rules of EU law); id. art. 
11(5) (mandatory rules of the lex rei sitae). 
 57. See the codifications of Albania (art. 52.2 (consumers only)); FYROM 
(arts. 24–25); Japan (arts. 11–12); South Korea (arts. 27–28); Liechtenstein 
(arts. 45, 48); Quebec (arts. 3117–18); Russia (art. 1212); Serbia (arts. 141–
42); Switzerland (arts. 120–21); Turkey (arts. 26–27); Ukraine (art. 45). 
 58. See the codifications of Argentina (draft arts. 2599–2600); Azerbaijan 
(arts. 4–5, 24.4); Belarus (arts. 1099, 1100); Georgia (art. 35.3); Kazakhstan 
(arts. 1090, 1091); Kyrgyzstan (art. 1173, 1174); Quebec (arts. 3079, 3081); 
Russia (arts. 1192, 1193); Serbia (draft arts. 40.2, 144); Tajikistan (arts.1197–
98); Tunisia (arts. 36, 38); Turkey (arts. 5, 6, 31); Ukraine (arts. 12, 14); Uru-
guay (arts. 5.1, 6.1–2); and Uzbekistan (arts. 1164, 1165); see also Hague 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Agency arts. 16, 17, Mar. 14, 1978, 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/conventions/txt27en.pdf [hereinafter Hague 
Agency Convention]. Article 9(3) of Rome I is similar to these articles except 
that it is limited to the state of performance. It allows courts to “give effect” 
to the “overriding mandatory provisions” of the place of performance “in so 
far as” those provisions “render the performance of the contract unlawful.” 
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mandatory provisions of the law of another State with which 
the contract has close ties.”59 
Similarly, Article 11 of the Hague Principles restates the or-
dre public exception and preserves the application of the man-
datory rules of the lex fori. The same article also provides that 
the lex fori determines when a court “may or must apply or 
take into account”: (a) the overriding mandatory provisions of 
another law; or (b) the public policy of the state whose law 
would be applicable in the absence of a choice of law (lex 
causae).60 
As the above description indicates, the codifications of the 
first two groups produce antithetical results in several patterns 
of cases. These differences have been discussed in detail in an-
other publication, which also offers an assessment of the rela-
tive strengths and weaknesses of each of the three groups.61 
III. THE THRESHOLDS FOR EMPLOYING THE LIMITATIONS TO 
PARTY AUTONOMY 
Another disagreement among various systems is defining the 
threshold that the parties’ choice must exceed before being held 
unenforceable. If any difference between the lex limitativa and 
the chosen law would defeat the parties’ choice, then party au-
tonomy would become a specious gift. As one court noted, “[t]he 
result would be that parties would have the right to choose the 
application of another state’s law only when that state’s law is 
identical to [the lex causae]. Such an approach would be ridicu-
lous.”62 
Accepting the old distinction between ordre public interne 
and ordre public international, most systems agree on the need 
for a higher level or threshold of public policy for multistate 
contracts than for domestic contracts. This fine conceptual dis-
tinction suggests that courts should be more tolerant toward 
private volition in multistate contracts than in domestic con-
tracts. But there is much less of a consensus in precisely defin-
                                                                                                                       
 59. Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to International 
Contracts art. 11, Mar. 17, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 732 [hereinafter Mexico Conven-
tion]. 
 60. Hague Principles, supra note 27, art. 11. 
 61. See Symeon C. Symeonides, Party Autonomy and the Lex Limitativa, 
66 REVUE HELLÉNIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL (forthcoming 2014). 
 62. Cherokee Pump & Equip. Inc. v. Aurora Pump, 38 F.3d 246, 252 (5th 
Cir. 1994). 
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ing this threshold and especially applying it in practice. Em-
phatic but actually unquantifiable adjectives such as “funda-
mental” public policy63 or “overriding” mandatory rules64 reflect 
some of those differences. 
A. The Ordre Public of the Lex Fori 
At least theoretically, the highest threshold is the one posed 
by the ordre public exception of the forum state, when properly 
applied. The international literature has developed a consen-
sus, which is reflected in many recent codifications, that a 
proper application of this exception must be based on the fol-
lowing elements: 
(1) Ordre public in this context contemplates a strongly held 
public policy. Some codifications express this notion by refer-
ring to “fundamental principles,”65 “fundamental values,”66 
“basic principles of social organization laid down by the Con-
stitution,”67 or “those principles of the social and governmen-
tal system of the [forum state] and its law, whose observance 
must be required without exception.”68 
(2) Ordre public in this context refers to the “international” or 
“external” public policy rather than the forum’s “internal” 
public policy. The idea is that multistate contracts are enti-
tled to more tolerant treatment than domestic contracts. The 
codifications of Peru, Portugal, and Uruguay express this con-
cept by specifically referring to the “international” public poli-
cy of the forum state,69 the Quebec codification refers to ordre 
public “as understood in international relations,”70 and the 
Tunisian and Romanian codifications refer to the ordre public 
“in the sense of private international law.”71 
                                                                                                                       
 63. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(b) (1971). 
 64. See Regulation on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations 
(Rome I), supra note 54  art. 9(2)–(3). 
 65. German codif. art. 6; Belarusian codif. art. 1099; Kyrgyzstani codif. 
1173; North Korean codif. art. 13; Mexican codif. art. 15.1.II; Portuguese cod-
if. art. 22; Ukrainian codif. art. 12; Uzbekistani codif. art. 1164. 
 66. Liechtenstein codif. art. 6; Tunisian codif. art. 36 (“fundamental choic-
es”); Venezuelan codif. art. 8 (“essential principles”). 
 67. Croatian codif. art. 4. 
 68. Slovak codif. art. 36. 
 69. Peruvian codif. art. 2079; Portuguese codif. art. 22; Uruguayan draft 
codif. art. 5. 
 70. Quebec codif. art. 3081. 
 71. Tunisian codif. art. 36; Romanian codif. art. 9. 
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(3) What is to be compared is the “effect,” “result,” or “conse-
quences” of the application of the chosen law in the particular 
case (rather than the chosen law in the abstract) with the 
public policy of the forum state.72 
(4) The application of the chosen law must produce a result 
that is clearly or “manifestly incompatible” with the forum’s 
public policy.73 
Deviating from this consensus, some codifications phrase the 
ordre public exception in terms that suggest a lower threshold. 
For example, the Chinese codification provides that if the ap-
plication of a foreign law will “cause harm to the social and 
public interests of [China], the law of [China] shall be ap-
plied.”74 The codifications of Yemen and the United Arab Emir-
                                                                                                                       
 72. Virtually all codifications contain words to this effect. See, e.g., Polish 
codif. art. 7 (“A foreign law shall not be applied, if its application would lead 
to consequences that are incompatible with the public policy of the Republic 
of Poland.”). See the following codifications and the pertinent articles indicat-
ed in parentheses for additional examples: Angola (art. 22), Armenia (art. 
1258), Austria (art. 6), Belarus (art. 1099), Belgium (art. 21), Bulgaria (art. 
45), Cape Verde (art. 22), Croatia (art. 4), East Timor (art. 21), Estonia (art. 
7), FYROM (art. 5), Germany (art. 6), Guinea-Bissau (art. 22); Hungary (art. 
7), Italy (art. 16), Japan (art. 42), Kazakhstan (art. 1090), South Korea (art. 
10), Kyrgyzstan (art. 1173), Liechtenstein (art. 6), Lithuania (art. 1.11), Ma-
cau (art. 20), Mexico (art. 15.I.II), Moldova (art. 1583), Mozambique (art. 22), 
Netherlands (art. 6), Peru (art. 2049), Portugal (art. 22), Quebec (art. 3081), 
Serbia (art. draft. art. 39), Russia (art. 1193), Slovakia (art. 36), Slovenia (art. 
5), Switzerland (art. 17), Taiwan (art. 8), Tajikistan (art. 1197.1); Ukraine 
(art. 12), Uruguay (art. 5), Uzbekistan (art. 1164), and Venezuela (art. 8). The 
Russian codification and the codifications bearing Russian influence state 
specifically that the refusal to apply the foreign law may not be based merely 
on the difference between the legal, political, or economic system of the two 
countries. See Russian codif. art. 1193; Armenian codif. art. 1258(2); Kazakh-
stani codif. art. 1090(2); Kyrgyzstani codif. art. 1173(2); Tajikistani codif. art. 
1197.2; Ukrainian codif. art. 12(2); Uzbekistani codif. 1164. 
 73. The majority of codifications and conventions contain words to this 
effect. See, e.g., Belgian codif. art. 21; Bulgarian codif. art. 21; Dutch codif. 
art. 6; South Korean codif. art. 10; Peruvian codif. art. 2079; Rome I, supra 
note 54, art. 21; Swiss codif. art. 17; Ukrainian codif. art. 12; Venezuelan art. 
8; Mexico City Convention art. 18; Hague Agency Convention, supra note 58, 
art. 17; Hague Sales Convention, supra note 40, art. 18. 
 74. Chinese codif. art. 6. For a discussion of the Chinese codification, see 
Jieying Liang, Statutory Restrictions on Party Autonomy in China’s Private 
International Law of Contract: How Far Does the 2010 Codification Go?, 8 J. 
PRIV. INT’L L. 77 (2012); Yongping Xiao & Weidi Long, Contractual Party Au-
tonomy in Chinese Private International Law, 11 Y.B. PRIV. INT’L L. 193, 
204-05 (2009). 
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ates provide that foreign law will not be applied if it is contrary 
to “Islamic law, public policy or good morals,”75 while the Irani-
an codification provides that “private agreements concluded 
among parties are valid, if they are not against mandatory 
laws.”76 
B. The “Overriding” Mandatory Rules of the Lex Fori 
Rome I distinguishes between “overriding” and “simple” 
mandatory rules. It defines the latter as rules that “cannot be 
derogated from by agreement,”77 and the former as rules that 
the enacting state regards as “crucial . . . for safeguarding its 
public interests, such as its political, social or economic organi-
sation, to such an extent that they are applicable to any situa-
tion falling within their scope, irrespective of the law otherwise 
applicable.”78 Obviously, the two definitions contemplate a 
much higher threshold for applying the “overriding” than the 
“simple” mandatory rules.79 Rome I ensures that the chosen 
law may not violate the overriding mandatory rules of the lex 
fori by providing that “[n]othing in this Regulation shall re-
strict the application of the overriding mandatory provisions of 
the law of the forum.”80 
Twenty-four codifications outside the EU and four conven-
tions expressly authorize the application of the overriding 
mandatory rules of the forum state. Although these codifica-
tions do not use the word “overriding,” they use phraseology 
that contemplates an equally high threshold as that of Rome I. 
They provide that these mandatory rules apply “directly”81 and 
                                                                                                                       
 75. Yemeni codif. art. 36; Emirati codif. art. 27. 
 76. Iranian codif. art. 10. 
 77. Rome I, supra note 54, arts. 3(3–4), 6(2), 8(1). 
 78. Id. art. 9(1). The “overriding” mandatory rules are also known as “in-
ternationally mandatory” or “super mandatory” rules, while the “simple” 
mandatory rules are sometimes referred to as “domestic” or “internal” man-
datory rules. 
 79. See id. pmbl., para. 37 (“The concept of ‘overriding mandatory provi-
sions’ should be distinguished from the expression ‘provisions which cannot 
be derogated from by agreement’ and should be construed more restrictive-
ly.”). 
 80. Id. art. 9(2). 
 81. Chinese codif. art. 5. 
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“irrespective of,”82 “regardless of,”83 or “notwithstanding”84 the 
law designated by the codification’s choice-of-law rules, includ-
ing the rules that allow a contractual choice of law. 
Eighteen codifications outside the EU also authorize the ap-
plication of the overriding mandatory rules of a “third” state 
that has a “close” (but not necessarily a closer or the closest) 
connection with the case.85 In this context, the “third” state is a 
state other than the forum state or the chosen state. More like-
ly, it will be the state of the lex causae, but it can also be an-
other state, i.e., a fourth state. Although the overriding manda-
tory rules of that state must embody at least the same high 
level of public policy as those of the forum state, their applica-
tion is not assured. While the forum’s mandatory rules apply 
automatically, the application of foreign mandatory rules is al-
ways discretionary: the court “may” apply or “take into ac-
count” the mandatory rules of the third state after considering 
the “nature” and “purpose” of those rules and the “consequenc-
es of their application or non-application.”86 
C. The Public Policy of the Lex Causae 
The few codifications that use the public policy of the lex 
causae as the gauge for policing party autonomy also contem-
plate a high-level policy. The Louisiana codification conveys 
this notion by referring to “strongly held” policies87 of the lex 
causae, the Restatement (Second) uses the qualifier “funda-
                                                                                                                       
 82. Rome I, supra note 54, art. 9(1); Rome II, supra note 26, art. 16; Bel-
gian codif. art. 20; Dutch codif. art. 7; FYROM codif. art. 14; Italian codif. art. 
17, South Korean codif. art. 7; Swiss codif. art. 18. 
 83. Belarusian codif. art. 1100(1); Kyrgyzstani codif. art. 1174(1); Lithua-
nian codif. art. 1.11(2). 
 84. Bulgarian codif. art. 46(1); Venezuelan codif. art. 10; Mexico City Con-
vention, art. 11. 
 85. Cf. Rome I, supra note 54, art. 9(3), which allows courts to “give effect” 
to the “overriding mandatory provisions” of the place of performance “in so 
far as” those provisions “render the performance of the contract unlawful.” 
 86. Dutch codif. art. 7(3). Identical or similar language exists in all provi-
sions under discussion here. Of course, consideration of the nature, purpose, 
and consequences of a rule is also necessary for determining whether a rule of 
the lex fori qualifies as a mandatory rule. 
 87. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3540 cmt. f (1992) (“[O]nly strongly held beliefs 
of a particular state qualify for the characterization of ‘public policy.’”). 
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mental,”88 and the Oregon codification speaks of an “estab-
lished fundamental” policy.89 
However, although the word “fundamental” suggests a fairly 
high threshold, the examples the Restatement provides about 
rules that embody a fundamental policy—statutes that make 
certain contracts illegal, and statutes intended to protect one 
party from “the oppressive use of superior bargaining pow-
er,”90—suggest a much lower threshold than that of the classic 
ordre public. The same is true of the Oregon codification, which 
defines a fundamental policy as a policy that “reflects objec-
tives or gives effect to essential public or societal institutions 
beyond the allocation of rights and obligations of parties to a 
contract at issue.”91 Moreover, as noted earlier, the Restate-
ment states that this public policy “need not be as strong” as 
that contemplated by the traditional ordre public exception.92 
Indeed, under the classic American test articulated by Judge 
Cardozo, the ordre public exception should be employed only in 
exceptional cases in which the applicable foreign law is “shock-
ing” to the forum’s sense of justice and fairness.93 
D. The “Simple” Mandatory Rules 
Finally, the lowest threshold for defeating party autonomy is 
that posed by the “simple” mandatory rules, namely rules that, 
in the words of Rome I, “cannot be derogated from by agree-
ment.” As noted earlier, Rome I employs this threshold in two 
categories of contracts: 
(a) Contracts in which “all other elements” other than the 
parties’ choice are “located in a country other than the coun-
try whose law has been chosen.”94 In these contracts, the par-
                                                                                                                       
 88. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2) (1971). 
 89. OR. REV. STAT. § 15.355(1)(c) (2013). 
 90. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 187 cmt. g. 
 91. OR. REV. STAT. § 15.355(2) (2013) 
 92. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 187 cmt. g. 
 93. See Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of N.Y., 120 N.E. 198, 201–02 (N.Y. 
1918) (The foreign law must “offend our sense of justice or menace the public 
welfare,” or “violate some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent 
conception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the common weal,” 
or “shock our sense of justice.”). 
 94. Rome I, supra note 54, art. 3(3); see also id. art. 3(4); Rome Convention, 
supra note 53, art. 3(3). 
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ties’ choice “shall not prejudice” the simple mandatory rules of 
that other country.95 
(b) Consumer or employment contracts in which the parties 
chose the law of a state other than the state of the lex causae. 
In these contracts, the parties’ choice of another law may not 
deprive the consumer or the employee of the protection of the 
simple mandatory rules of the lex causae.96 
Outside the EU, similar rules for consumer contracts are 
found in the codifications of about a dozen states.97 
IV. MAKING THE PIE 
This brief Article simply catalogues and describes the differ-
ent ways in which various choice-of-law systems slice the party 
autonomy pie. As the Article documents, these systems answer 
differently the following key questions: 
(a) Which contracts, if any, to exempt from the scope of party 
autonomy? 
(b) Which contractual issues, if any, to exempt from the scope 
of party autonomy? 
(c) Which state’s standards to use for determining the limits 
of party autonomy (lex limitativa)? and 
                                                                                                                       
 95. Outside the EU, similar rules are found in the codifications of Albania 
(art. 45.4), South Korea (art.25.4), Quebec (art. 3111), and Serbia (draft art. 
136.6). 
 96. See Rome I, supra note 54, arts. 6(2), 8(1). Article 11 of Rome I seems 
to contemplate an intermediate category between the simple mandatory rules 
of Articles 6 and 8 and the “overriding” mandatory rules of Article 9. Article 
11 provides that in contracts, the subject matter of which is an in rem right 
in immovable property or a tenancy of immovable property, the parties’ 
choice of non-situs law may not derogate from those rules of the situs state 
that mandate compliance with a particular form if those rules “are imposed  
. . . irrespective of the law governing the contract.” Id., art. 11. 
 97. See the codifications of Albania (art. 52.2), Russia (art. 1212), and 
Ukraine (art. 45), and for both consumer and employment contracts in the 
codifications of FYROM (arts. 24–25), Japan (arts. 11–12), South Korea (arts. 
27–28), Liechtenstein (arts. 45, 48), Puerto Rico (arts. 5–36), Quebec (arts. 
3117–18), Serbia (arts. 141–42), and Turkey (arts. 256–27). However, unlike 
Rome I, the Japanese codification provides that the consumer or employee is 
entitled to the protection of the mandatory rules of the lex causae only if 
he/she “expresses his/her will to [the other party] to the effect that such man-
datory rules should apply.” Japanese codif. arts. 11–12. 
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(d) How high should the threshold be for employing those lim-
its? 
The answers to the above questions form the basic ingredi-
ents with which various systems make the party autonomy pie. 
Obviously, the quality of the pie depends not only on these in-
gredients (e.g., in what dosages and combinations they are 
used), but also on other variable factors that have to do with 
the actual implementation. For example, a high public policy 
threshold usually implies a liberal regime. Nevertheless, a high 
threshold that is employed too frequently in practice will pro-
duce a restrictive regime. Conversely, although a low threshold 
normally suggests a restrictive regime, a low threshold that 
courts employ only rarely will produce a liberal regime. 
Similarly, a system such as Rome I, and the codifications 
emulating the Rome Convention, that exempts consumer and 
employment contracts from the scope of party autonomy can 
afford to be, and is, more liberal in other contracts. Conversely, 
a system such as the Restatement (Second) that does not ex-
empt any contracts from the scope of party autonomy appears 
to be too liberal toward party autonomy.98 But, the Restate-
ment mitigates that liberality by using a public policy thresh-
old that is both lower and more readily deployable than the 
threshold for Rome I. 
This Article does not purport to compare and assess the qual-
ity of the various party autonomy pies produced around the 
world; not because the author has no opinion99 or because this 
is a matter of individual taste, but rather because a fair com-
parison is a complex undertaking that requires more time and 
space than is allotted to this Article.100 One hopes, however, 
that by showing the many different ways of slicing the pie, this 
Article can contribute to a more nuanced assessment of the 
various party autonomy pies. 
                                                                                                                       
 98. Likewise, systems such as the Louisiana, Oregon, and Puerto Rico cod-
ifications, which exempt issues of capacity, consent, and formation from the 
scope of party autonomy, can be less circumspect about the parties’ choice for 
other issues. 
 99. The author’s positions are reflected in the codifications he has drafted. 
See supra notes 44–46. 
 100. For such a comparison and assessment, see SYMEONIDES, CODIFYING 
CHOICE OF LAW, supra note 5, 161–70. 
